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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1707 
___________ 
 
PATRICK JONES, 
                      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN LEWISBURG USP 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 3-13-cv-03105) 
District Judge:  Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6  
October 29, 2015 
Before:  FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 5, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Patrick Jones (federal prisoner number 60763-080) appeals pro se from the  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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District Court’s dismissal of his habeas petition and denial of reconsideration.  We will 
affirm. 
I. 
 Jones is serving concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for convictions relating 
to the distribution of crack cocaine.  Those sentences were imposed in 2003 by the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Texas.  Jones has challenged his 
convictions and sentences in numerous proceedings, including a motion under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 in his sentencing court and a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in at least 
one of his prior courts of confinement.  See Jones v. Fox, 326 F. App’x 320, 320-21 (5th 
Cir. 2009). 
 Jones filed the § 2241 petition at issue here after being transferred to a federal 
prison within the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  The petition has two aspects.  First, 
Jones claims to be innocent of the charges underlying his life sentences on the grounds 
that his sentencing court imposed them on the basis of facts and charges that were not 
found by the jury.  Jones has cited no authority in support of his claims in that regard, but 
they appear to be based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  Second, Jones 
claims that officials at a federal prison in Kentucky denied him due process during three 
hearings.  Two of those hearings were disciplinary proceedings that resulted in Jones’s 
transfer to a Special Management Unit in Pennsylvania (but not the loss of any good 
conduct time), and the third was a hearing on his designation for that transfer. 
 The District Court dismissed Jones’s petition.  The District Court concluded that 
Jones could not challenge his sentences by means of a § 2241 petition because he did not 
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show that a § 2255 motion in his sentencing court was or would have been inadequate or 
ineffective to raise his claims.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Okereke v. United States, 307 
F.3d 117, 120-21 (3d Cir. 2002); cf. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 248-49 (3d Cir. 
1997).  The District Court further concluded that Jones’s challenges to his disciplinary 
proceedings and transfer to the Special Management Unit are not cognizable in habeas 
because they do not implicate the duration of his confinement or the execution of his 
sentence.  See Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2012); Leamer v. Fauver, 
288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002).  Jones filed a motion for reconsideration, which the 
District Court denied, and Jones now appeals.1 
II. 
 We will affirm for the reasons adequately explained by the District Court.  We 
separately address only two of Jones’s arguments on appeal, all of which relate solely to 
his criminal sentences.  First, Jones argues that he may proceed under § 2241 because the 
sentences he challenges are not based on facts found by the jury and thus are not based on 
any actual “conviction” that he can challenge under § 2255.  This argument is frivolous.  
Section 2255 expressly permits challenges to a sentence in the sentencing court, and 
Jones’s substantive claims are based on alleged occurrences before that court at trial and 
at sentencing.  There is no reason why Jones could not have raised his claims before that  
                                              
1 Jones does not require a certificate of appealability to appeal from the denial of his § 
2241 motion, see Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433 (3d Cir. 2012), and we thus have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s legal conclusions and otherwise review its denial of reconsideration only for 
abuse of discretion.  See Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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court, if indeed he has not done so already.   
 Second, Jones argues that he may proceed under § 2241 because he is innocent.  
He relies for that argument on Dorsainvil and McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 
(2013).  In Dorsainvil, we held that a federal prisoner could proceed under § 2241 
because he had no prior opportunity to raise an intervening Supreme Court decision that 
rendered his conduct non-criminal.  See Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251.  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in McQuiggin, however, does not render Jones’s conduct non-criminal.  
Instead, McQuiggin holds that actual innocence constitutes an equitable exception to the 
statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).  See McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 
1931-32.  McQuiggin thus has nothing to do with Jones’s conduct of conviction.  It also 
has nothing to do with his substantive claims, which he could have raised before.  And 
even if his claims had merit, which we do not suggest, they would not establish his 
innocence in the first place. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Jones’s 
motion for appointment of counsel in this Court is denied.  
